Δημοσιεύθηκε από το Κυπριακό Κέντρο Ευρωπαϊκών και Διεθνών Υποθέσεων
του Πανεπιστημίου Λευκωσίας
(Περιοδική έκδοση InDepth Vol.11 Issue 6 / 01.12.2014 )
Publishe by the Cyprus Centre of European and International Affairs
University of Nicosia
Egypt,
under the presidency of Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi, is re-experiencing the
implementation of the Mubarak doctrine on the country's regional
alliances. Al-Sisi, one of the key figures during the uprising against
Mohammad Morsi's regime in 2012, has been very clear about the way he
sees Egypt's place in the world: Cairo strengthened its intelligence and
military cooperation with Israel vis-à-vis the Hamas regime in the Gaza
Strip, which allegedly holds strong ties with Islamic factions in the
Sinai peninsula. The Egyptian government clearly shows its strategic
resilience to the US-led coalition against the Islamic State in Syria
and Iraq, which has resulted in the renewal of the decades-long
political alliance with other pro-Western Sunni Arab States, such as
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. Al-Sisi
does his best in order to show his differentiation towards the Muslim
Brotherhood's brief control of political power under Morsi, adopting
severe measures against radical political Islam, in order to remind to
the West that Cairo is able to continue to bridge the Arab world and the
West, as it did during the Mubarak era. Egypt is annoyed by Turkish and
Qatari intrusiveness over the issues concerning the influence of
political Islam in Egypt's political scene and in the Levant in general.
At the same time, Egypt and the West are preoccupied with the unstable
situation in neighboring Libya, while both keep a low profile towards
Assad's secular regime in view of a Western-led coalition against the
Islamic State.
President
Al-Sisi's regional agenda shows that Mubarak's legacy in the country's
foreign policy will continue to affect Egyptian decision-makers,
following a brief period of pro-Islamic ambivalence that puzzled the
country's traditional ties with Western countries in the Mediterranean,
that shared a common past of good relations. One of those countries is
the Republic of Cyprus.
In
a volatile Middle East and South east Mediterranean, regional alliances
do not remain stable. However, geographical facts do - and Cyprus has
always been important for Egypt. During the '60s Gamal Abdel Nasser
viewed Cyprus as a strategic ally that might reflect Cairo's regional
endeavors through Nicosia's activity in the Non-Aligned Movement,
despite – and due to - the fact that the island was an integral part of
NATO's regional military presence. During the '70s and '80s Cyprus was
an additional positive factor for Egypt's commercial and diplomatic
relations with the West. Nevertheless, Cairo understood well that
keeping a low profile over the continuing Turkish occupation of the
northern part of the island was essential in order to prevent any
undesired correlation affecting Cairo's normalized, yet vulnerable, ties
with Israel, a country which maintained a strong strategic alliance
with Ankara for decades.
The
Mavi Marmara incident in June 2010 severely affected the
Turkish-Israeli coalition, while the newly founded natural gas resources
within the Cypriot and Israeli EEZs' created a new reality, with
imminent economic prospects as well as security concerns. During that
time, the Egyptian political scene was facing severe agitations. Despite
the fact that during these last two years President Al-Sisi and his
military forces have proven their ability to control the country's
political system, at the same time, jihadist paramilitary activity is
still negatively affecting the exports of Egyptian natural gas to Israel
and Jordan, severely damaging gas pipelines along the northern coast of
the Sinai. The situation is similar along the Egyptian borders with
Libya, a country that until now hasn’t recovered from the uprising
against its previous leader Moamar Al-Ghaddafi. The Al-Sisi
administration did manage to restore the country's reputation in the
West, but Egypt, now more than ever, is experiencing a quasi
isolation on the ground from its immediate geostrategic setting,
affecting financial prospects, based upon the country's natural gas
resources off its Mediterranean coasts.
As
geography has its own rules, Cyprus is once again important to Egypt.
As an EU member-State, friendly to Israel, with historical ties to
Egypt's position within the Arab world, sharing common endeavors in the
regional energy market, the Republic of Cyprus can once again, be an
important strategic ally to Egypt, providing direct access to the
European markets. In the framework of this win-win situation, Cypriot
natural gas resources are on the verge of playing a major role. On the
political field, Egypt has already given clear signs of good will
towards the Greek-Cypriot views on the Cyprus issue, by calling for the
exclusion of the self-proclaimed 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'
from the Islamic Conference of which it is currently monitoring. This
move firmly expresses Cairo's anti-Turkish regional policy – a fact that
Nicosia, under the present circumstances, cannot ignore.
On
the other hand, the Republic of Cyprus has comprehended that Israel is
reluctantly moving towards a practical –and not only verbal- cooperation
in the fields of natural gas exploitation within the
Cypriot EEZ, mainly due to Jerusalem's expectation that Turkish regional
policy is about to change in favor of Israel, in view of a Western-led
broad military coalition against the Islamic State. At the same time,
Turkish-Israeli cooperation in the private sector is flourishing,
despite the four-year-long diplomatic turbulences. As a result, and
despite the frequency of common Cypriot-Israeli military exercises
within the Cypriot territorial waters and airspace as well as Israeli
FM's declarations, publicly backing Nicosia's argumentations over the
Republic of Cyprus' exploration rights, Israel is avoiding to proceed
with any practical move that would consolidate on the ground a
long-lasting Cypriot-Israeli energy axis – a fact which might endanger
or even annihilate the prospect of a future rapprochement with Turkey,
an important regional player for Israel's security concerns.
However,
in case the recent talks between Egypt, Cyprus and Greece result in
vital strategic partnership, Israel might reconsider its position. It
may eventually decide to differentiate its energy projects with the
Republic of Cyprus from its important security cooperation with Turkey,
in case Ankara reevaluates its Middle Eastern policy.
No
matter what the future holds for Israeli-Turkish relations, Israel's
energy policy will always be related to its western sea borders with the
Republic of Cyprus and the Cypriot EEZ. In case Nicosia and Cairo
consolidate a cooperation on their energy projects, which would
eventually include a strategic alignment with Greece, Israel might
decide to become a part of a stable EU-backed energy exploitation
environment, guaranteeing sustainable ties with Europe – a perspective
boosting competitiveness in the energy market for both Egypt and Israel.
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